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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The District Court Erred By Applying An Incorrect Legal Standard In Determining
Silver Was In Custody For Purposes Of Miranda Prior To His Formal Arrest

A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it relied on Silver's reasonable belief that he

was going to be placed under arrest in determining whether Silver was already in
custody for purposes of Miranda 1 when he made incriminating statements to
officers. The district court thus erred when it granted Silver's motion to suppress
those statements.
On appeal, Silver does not dispute that the district court utilized an
incorrect standard, but instead argues that the district court's ultimate conclusion
to suppress the statements was correct.

(See generally, Respondent's brief.)

Silver's argument fails because a review of the totality of the circumstances
reveals that he was not actually in custody for purposes of Miranda until he was
formally arrested.
B.

Silver Was Not In Custody For Purposes Of Mianda Until His Formal
Arrest
The test for determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes of

Miranda is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation, there was a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of
the degree associated with a formal arrest."

California v. Beheler, 463 U.S.

1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

1

Relevant factors in making this determination include the time, location,
public visibility of the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, the nature and
manner of the questioning, the extent to which officers confront the suspect with
evidence of his guilt, and the presence of other persons. State v. Medrano, 123
Idaho 114, 117, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Albaugh, 133
Idaho 587, 591, 990 P.2d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 1999); see also U.S. v. Brobst, 558
F.3d 982, 995-997 (91h Cir. 2009).

Because the "in custody" test for Miranda

requires a restraint on freedom associated with formal arrest, a person subjected
to an investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,
although not "free to leave," is ordinarily not in custody for purposes of Miranda.
See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
In this case, the district court suppressed incriminating statements made
by Silver after police officers located marijuana on Silver's person and in his car.
(R., pp.71-86.) The court concluded that by this point during Silver's contact with

the officers, Silver had a "reasonable belief that he was going to be placed under
arrest."

(R., p.83.)

The district court erred because the legal standard for

determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda is not
whether a reasonable person believes they will be put into custody to a degree
associated with formal arrest, but rather whether a reasonable person believes
they are presently in custody to a degree associated with formal arrest.

See

State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 854, 11 P.3d 44, 50 (Ct. App. 2000).
On appeal, Silver does not dispute that the district court applied an
incorrect legal standard. Instead, Silver emphasizes this Court's free review of
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the district court's legal conclusion and that "[t]he sole issue this Court needs to
determine is whether the district court was correct in finding that Silver was in
custody for the purposes of [Miranda]." (Respondent's brief, pp.5-6.)

However,

a review of the record reveals that Silver was not in custody for purposes of
Miranda until he was formally arrested.
In contending that Silver was in custody for purposes of Miranda by the
time officers recovered marijuana from his vehicle, Silver relies primarily on the
officers' confronting of Silver with this evidence, and the nature of their
questioning regarding Silver's drug activity.

(See Respondent's brief, pp.6-9.)

Silver essentially contends that what began as a "routine" traffic stop evolved into
a custodial arrest by virtue of this questioning, which exceeded the scope of the
purpose of the original stop, and which included threats of future arrest. (Id.)
At what point a traffic stop is no longer "routine" was also the focus
employed by a majority of the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. James, Docket
No. 33895, 2008 Opinion No. 56 (Ct. App. June 13, 2008) (overruled .Qy State v.
James, 148 Idaho 574, 225 P.3d 1169 (2010)). While recognizing that "routine"
traffic stops do not implicate Miranda, the Idaho Court of Appeals found that
events occurring during James' traffic stop, including the officer's threat to arrest
all of the occupants in the car and James' admission of ownership of
methamphetamine found in his vehicle, "significantly distinguish[ed] [the case]
from an ordinary traffic stop." James, Docket No. 33895, 2008 Opinion No. 56,
p.3.

3

The Idaho Supreme Court overruled the Idaho Court of Appeals and
concluded that the officer's discovery of methamphetamine in the vehicle, the
existence of probable cause to arrest all three occupants of the vehicle, and the
officer's threats to perform such arrests, did not transform the investigative
detention into a formal arrest for the purposes of Miranda where there was an
absence of other factors associated with formal arrest. James, 148 Idaho at 576578, 225 P.3d at 1171-1173. In James, as in the present case, it was only the
discovery of the drugs and the subsequent questioning of the suspects that
placed the case in "a unique circumstance in considering whether James was 'in
custody' for Miranda purposes." See James, Docket No. 33895, 2008 Opinion
No. 56, pp.4-6 (Perry, J. dissenting).
Indeed, while Miranda is not implicated during "routine" traffic stops,
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 422-425, James makes clear that it does not follow from
Berkemer that Miranda warnings are required in all non-routine traffic stops.
Specifically, Miranda warnings are not necessarily required where evidence
found in the course of a routine traffic stop establishes probable cause of drug
crimes.

The traffic stop in James was anything but routine once the officers

discovered methamphetamine. In a Miranda custody analysis, the proper focus
is on the restraint of liberty placed on a suspect, not whether the stop is routine.
Specifically, as the Colorado Supreme Court explained in People v.
Figueroa-Ortega, 283 P.3d 691, 693 (Colo. 2012), the United States Supreme
Court, in its Miranda custody analyses, has emphasized those factors which
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constitute infringements on liberty typically distinguishing a mere investigative
stop from an arrest:
Because interrogation can be custodial only if the person
being interrogated has at least been stopped, the non-exclusive list
of factors frequently identified as bearing on the question of
whether a reasonable person would no longer feel free to leave,
and therefore whether he has been seized at all, remains relevant
for Miranda purposes. See People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 456466 (Colo. 2002). Because, however, that general list of factors
was actually developed to determine whether an encounter with law
enforcement officers has ceased to be consensual and therefore
has progressed beyond a contact short of a stop to a
constitutionally cognizable investigatory stop, see United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); see a/so People v. Pancoast,
659 P .2d 1348, 1350 (Colo. 1982), both this court and the [United
States] Supreme Court have emphasized more specifically those
infringements on liberty typically distinguishing a mere investigatory
stop from an arrest. By way of example, we have previously found
that, although not dispositive, drawn guns and physical restraints
like the use of handcuffs are more typically associated with an
arrest than a mere stop, see People v. Breidenback, 875 P.2d 879
(Colo. 1994), and that making clear to a detainee that he will not be
released after a short investigatory stop is similarly indicative of
arrest, see People v. Polander, 41 P.3d 698, 705 (Colo. 2001 ). In
Berkemer itself, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance,
from a detainee's perspective, of being removed to a secluded
place, even if only a patrol car, rather than being questioned in
public view, as would be more typical of an investigatory stop. 468
U.S. at 438.
Figueroa-Ortega, 283 P.3d at 692-693 (holding a suspect was not in custody for
purposes of Miranda even after detective confronted the suspect with video
surveillance evidence of a restaurant burglary).
The confronting of a suspect with evidence of his guilt, and the
questioning of a suspect about that evidence, are factors distinguishing a casual
encounter from an investigative detention. However, "[t]hose infringements on
liberty typically distinguishing a mere investigatory stop from an arrest," such as
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physical restraints, drawn weapons, removal of a suspect from public view, and
statements to a suspect that he is under arrest, were simply not present during
Silver's contact with law enforcement prior to his formal arrest.
Further, while an officer's confronting of a suspect with evidence of his
guilt can be a factor in establishing Miranda custody, the officers' confronting of
Silver with the discovered marijuana is not as strong a custody factor as the
corresponding confrontation in James.

In James, officers confronted the

suspects with evidence that gave the officers probable cause to arrest those
suspects for felony methamphetamine possession. James, 148 Idaho at 578,
225 P.3d at 1173.

In the present case, officers could confront Silver with

evidence that gave them probable cause to arrest him for the misdemeanor
crime of possession of under three ounces of marijuana.

See l.C. § 37-

2732(c)(3). The latter type of confrontation is less likely to cause a reasonable
person to believe his freedom of movement has been restrained to the degree
associated with a formal arrest, because it remains possible in such a situation
that an officer will merely issue a misdemeanor citation.

Consistent with the

existence of this possibility, before Silver was arrested, the officers in the present
case only discussed with him the potential of future arrest.

(See generally

State's Exhibit A.)
Neither the district court nor Silver has persuasively distinguished James.
On appeal, Silver states:
The State relies on James to support its claim that Silver
was not subject to a custodial interrogation. However, this reliance
is misplaced. In James, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "a
6

conditional threat of future lawful arrest alone does not transform a
detention into 'custody' for purposes of Miranda."
However, unlike the suspect in James, Silver's interrogation
was not limited to the threat of future, lawful arrest. In fact, the
threat of future arrest was only one of a myriad of factors that
suggest that Silver was subject to a custodial interrogation. It was
past midnight by the time the officers began questioning Silver
about marijuana. Likewise, there were two officers at the scene,
late at night, both in marked vehicles, both in uniform and both
armed. There were no other people present at the scene. In
addition, as with the officers in [State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 798
P.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1990)], the questioning exceeded the scope of
the investigatory stop. As noted by the district court, there would
be no reason for the officers to inquire as to Silver's intended
purpose of the marijuana found at the scene, other than to elevate
a misdemeanor to a felony.
(Respondent's brief, pp.8-9 (citations and footnotes omitted).)
The "myriad of factors" that Silver suggests supports the district court's
granting of his motion to suppress was largely also present in James. As in the
present case, James' encounter with police occurred after midnight, following a
traffic stop, with only two officers and the suspects present. James, 148 Idaho at
575-578, 225 P .3d at 1170-1173. Further, in both cases, the officers' questioning
of the suspects exceeded the scope of the original traffic stops once evidence of
drug possession was discovered. !Q,, In the present case, as in James, the
absence of other factors that more closely implicate techniques with which
Miranda was concerned, such as physical restraint, removal from a public place,
police domination, or affirmative police statements indicating current arrest, were
simply not present prior to Silver's formal arrest.
The district court applied an incorrect legal standard in determining
whether Silver was in custody for purposes of Miranda at the time he made
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incriminating statements to law enforcement officers. Application of the correct
standard reveals that Silver was not actually in Miranda custody until his formal
arrest. Reversal of the district court's granting of Silver's motion to suppress is
therefore appropriate.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
order suppressing Silver's statements and to remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of February 2013.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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